We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete information in which, at each stage of interaction, an agent can make her opinions visible (public) or invisible (private) in order to influence other agents' opinions. The influence process is mediated by a trust network, as we assume that the opinion of a given agent is only affected by the opinions of those agents that she considers trustworthy (i.e., the agents in the trust network that are directly linked to her). Each agent is endowed with a goal, expressed in a suitable temporal language inspired from linear temporal logic (LTL). We show that games of influence provide a simple abstraction to explore the effects of the trust network structure on the agents' behaviour, by considering solution concepts from game-theory such as Nash equilibrium, weak dominance and winning strategies.
Introduction
At the micro-level, social influence can be conceived as a process where an agent forms her opinion on the basis of the opinions expressed by other agents in the society. Social influence depends on trust since an agent can be influenced by another agent, so that her opinions are affected by the expressed opinions of the other, only if she trusts her. At the macro-level, social influence is the basic mechanism driving the diffusion of opinions in human societies: certain agents in the society influence other agents in the society towards a given view, and these agents, in turn, influence other agents to acquire the same view, and so on. In other words, social influence can be seen as the driving force of opinion diffusion in human and human-like agent societies. This view is resonant of existing studies in social sciences and social psychology which Quesada [10] , which does not however consider strategic aspects in their preference update model. The Facebook logic introduced by Seligman et al. [19] is also relevant, and motivated our effort in Section 4 to get rid of epistemic operators in the goal language. The difference between private and public information is reminiscent of the work of Christoff and Hansen [6, 7] , which also does not focus on strategic aspects. A related problem to opinion diffusion is that of information cascades and knowledge diffusion, which has been given formal treatment in a logical settings [16, 2] . Finally, our work is greatly indebted to the work of [14] , since an influence game can be considered as a variation of an iterated boolean game in which individuals do not have direct power on all the variables -there can be several individuals influencing another one -but concurrently participate in its change. Finally, [20] recently presented an extension of iterated boolean games with a social network structure in which agents choose actions depending on the actions of those in their neighbourhood.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic definition of private and public opinions, as well as our model of opinion diffusion. In Section 3 we present our language for goals based on an epistemic version of LTL, and we show that both the model-checking problem remains in PSPACE (as for LTL), by showing a reduction of the epistemic operator. Section 4 introduces the definition of influence games, and presents the main results about the effects of the network structure on solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and winning strategy, and on the complexity of checking that a given profile of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Opinion diffusion
In this section we present the model of opinion diffusion which is the starting point of our analysis. We generalise the model of propositional opinion diffusion introduced in related work [12] by separating private and public opinions, and adapting the notion of diffusion through aggregation to this more complex setting.
Private and public opinions
Let I = {p 1 , . . . , p m } be a finite set of propositions or issues and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of individuals or agents. Agents have opinions about all issues in I in the form of a propositional evaluations, or, equivalently, a vector of 0s and 1s: Definition 1 (private opinion). The private opinion of agent i is a function B i : I → {1, 0} where B i (p) = 1 and B i (p) = 0 express, respectively, the agent's opinion that p is true and the agent's opinion that p is false.
For every J ⊆ N , we denote with B J = Π i∈J B i the set of all tuples of opinions of the agents in J. Elements of B J are denoted by B J . For notational convenience, we write B instead of B N , and B i instead of B {i} .
Let B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) denote the profile composed by the individual opinion of each agent. Propositional evaluations can be used to represent ballots in a multiple referendum, expressions of preference over alternatives, or value judgements over correlated issues (see, e.g., [5, 11] ). Depending on the application at hand, an integrity constraint can be introduced to model the propositional correlation among issues. For the sake of simplicity in this paper we do not assume any correlation among the issues, but the setting can easily be adapted to this more general framework.
We also assume that each agent has the possibility of declaring or hiding her private opinion on each of the issues.
Definition 2 (visibility function)
. The visibility function of agent i is a map V i : I → {1, 0} where V i (p) = 1 and V i (p) = 0 express, respectively, the fact that agent i's opinion on p is visible and the fact that agent i's opinion on p is hidden.
We denote with V = (V 1 , . . . , V n ) the profile composed of the agents' visibility functions. By combining the private opinion with the visibility function of an agent we can build her public opinion as a three-valued function on the set of issues.
Definition 3 (public opinion). Let B i be agent i's opinion and V i her visibility function. The public opinion induced by B i and V i is a function P i : I → {1, 0, ?} such that
For every J ⊆ N , we denote with P J = Π i∈J P i the set of all tuples of public opinions of the agents in J. Elements of P J are denoted by P J . For notational convenience, we write P instead of P N , and P i instead of P {i} .
Once more, P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) denotes the profile of public opinions of all the agents in N . P i is aimed at capturing the public expression of i's view about the issues in I. Observe that an agent can only hide or declare her opinion about a given issue, but is not allowed to lie. Relaxing this assumption would actually represent an interesting direction for future work.
Information states
The information contained in a profile of public opinions can also be modelled using a state-based representation and an indistinguishability relation, in line with the existing work on interpreted systems (see, e.g., [8] ). States will form the building blocks of our model of strategic reasoning in opinion dynamics.
Definition 4 (state). A state is a tuple S = (B, V ) where B is a profile of private opinions and V is a profile of visibility functions. The set of all states is denoted by S.
The following definition formalises the uncertainty between states induced by the visibility functions. The idea is that an agent cannot distinguish between two states if and only if both the agent's individual opinion and the other agents' public opinions are the same according to the two states.
Definition 5 (Indistinguishability). Let S, S
′ ∈ S be two states. We say that agent i cannot distinguish between them, denoted by S ∼ i S ′ , if and only if:
• for all j ∈ N \ {i} and for all
Let S ∼i = {S ′ ∈ S | S ∼ i S ′ } be the set of states that agent i cannot distinguish from S. Clearly ∼ i is an equivalence relation. In what follows we will often use public states to represent the equivalence class of a state. Observe however that this is a too coarse representation, since each of the agents knows her own belief. 
Opinion diffusion through aggregation
In this section we define the influence process that is at the heart of our model. Our definition is a generalisation of the model by [12] .
First, we assume that individuals are connected by an influence network which we model as a directed graph: Definition 6 (influence network). An influence network is a directed irreflexive graph E ⊆ N × N . We interpret (i, j) ∈ E as "agent j is influenced by agent i".
We also refer to E as the influence graph and to individuals in N as the nodes of the graph. Let Inf (j) = {i ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ E} be the set of influencers of agent j in the network E. Given a state S, this definition can be refined by considering the set Inf S (i, p) = {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ E and P j (p) = ?} to be the subset of influencers that are actually expressing their private opinion about issue p. Clearly, Inf S (i, p) ⊆ Inf (i) for all p and S. Figure 2 represents a basic influence network where some agent i is influenced by two agents j and k. The set Inf (i) = {j, k}, and, using the notation in the previous example, the set Inf Given a profile of public opinions and an influence network E, we model the process of opinion diffusion by means of an aggregation function, which shapes the private opinion of an agent by taking into consideration the public opinions of her influencers. Aggregation functions are used to construct the new private opinion of an agent in the dynamic process of opinion diffusion. Thus, F i (B i , P Inf (i) ) represents the private opinion of agent i updated with the public opinions received by its influencers.
Example 2.
A number of aggregation procedures have been considered in the literature on judgment aggregation and can be adapted to our setting. Notable examples are quota rules, where an agent changes her opinion if the amount of people disagreeing with her is superior of a given quota (the majority rule is such an example). These aggregation procedures give rise to the class of threshold models studied in the literature on opinion diffusion [13, 17] .
For the sake of simplicity in this paper we consider that all agents use the following aggregation procedure: Definition 8. Let S = (B, V ) be a state and P the corresponding profile of public opinions. The unanimous issue-by-issue aggregation procedure is defined as follows:
That is, an individual will change her private opinion about issue p if and only if all her influencers that are expressing their opinion publicly are unanimous in disagreeing with her own one.
Strategic actions and state transitions
Showing or hiding information is a key action in the model of opinion diffusion defined above. The dynamic of opinion is rooted in two dimensions: the influence network and the visibility function. At each time step, by hiding or revealing their opinions, agents influence other agents opinions. We assume that agents can make their opinions visible or invisible by specific actions of type reveal(p) (i.e., action of making the opinion about p visible) and hide(p) (i.e., action of hiding the opinion about p). The action of doing nothing is denoted by skip. Let therefore
be the set of all individual actions and J = A n the set of all joint actions. Elements of J are denoted by a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Each joint action a induces a transition function between states. This function is deterministic and is defined as follows:
Definition 9 (transition function). The transition function succ : S × J −→ S associates to each state S and joint action a a new state
where, for all i ∈ N :
Where P ′ is the public profile obtained from private profile B and visibility functions
By a slight abuse of notation we denote with a(S) the state succ(S, a) obtained from S and a by applying the transition function. Observe that in our definition of transition function we are assuming that the influence process occurs after that the actions have modified the visibility of the agents' opinions. Specifically, first, actions have consequences on the visibility of the agents' opinions, then, each agent modifies her private opinions on the basis of those opinions of other agents that have become public.
We are now ready to define the concept of history, describing the temporal aspect of agents' opinion dynamic: Definition 10 (history). Given a set of issues I, a set of agents N , and aggregation procedures F i over a network E, an history is an infinite sequence of states H = (H 0 , H 1 , . . .). such that for all t ∈ N there exists a joint action a t ∈ J such that
Let H = (H 0 , H 1 , . . .) be an history. For notational convenience, for any i ∈ N and for any t ∈ N, we denote with H B i,t agent i's private opinion in state H t and with
The set of all histories is denoted by H. Observe that our definition restricts the set of all possible histories to those that corresponds to a run of the influence dynamic described above. 
The initial two states of a history.
Temporal and Epistemic Goals
As agents can hide or reveal their opinions, the strategic dimension of opinion diffusion is immediate: by revealing/hiding her opinion, an agent influences other agents. Influence is actually guided by some underlying goals. An agent reveals/hides her opinion only if she wants to influence some other agents: she aims at changing individual opinions. Temporal dimension is immediate as the dynamics of opinion has to be considered. Following [14] , we define a language to express individual epistemic goals about the state of the individual opinions.
Epistemic temporal logic of influence
Let us introduce a logical language based on a combination of simple version of multiagent epistemic logic and linear temporal logic (LTL) that can be interpreted over histories. In line with our framework, term epistemic state should be interpreted as private opinion. Goals in our perspective consists of targeting an epistemic state: typically ''agent i wants that agent j has private opinion ϕ in the future". The proposed language does not allow the temporal operator to be in the scope of a knowledge operator, obtaining a simpler language and a reduction that allows us to stay in the same complexity class as LTL.
We call ELTL-I this logic, from epistemic linear temporal logic of influence. Its language, denoted by L ELTL-I , is defined by the following BNF:
where i ranges over N and p ranges over I. op(i, p) has to be read "agent i's opinion is that p is true" while ¬op(i, p) has to be read "agent i's opinion is that p is not true" (since we assume that agents have binary opinions). vis(i, p) has to be read "agent i's opinion about p is visible". Finally, K i α has to be read "agent i knows that α is true".
Xϕ and U are the standard LTL operators 'next' and 'until'. In particular, Xϕ has to be read "ϕ is going to be true in the next state" and ϕ 1 Uϕ 2 has to be read "ϕ 1 will be true until ϕ 2 is true". As usual, we can define the temporal operators 'henceforth' (G) and 'eventually' (F) by means of the 'until' operator:
The interpretation of L ELTL-I -formulas relative to histories is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Truth conditions)
. Let ϕ be a L ELTL-I -formula, let H be a history and let k ∈ N. Then:
The operator K i is rather peculiar, and should not be interpreted as a classical individual epistemic operator. It mixes public and private opinions of our model. Operator K i reading is rather "agent i is uncertain about other agents private opinion as this opinion is not visible" and K i α stands for agent i knows α despite this uncertainty.
The following proposition shows that K i could also be formulated in terms of equivalence between histories rather than in terms of equivalence between states. Its proof is immediate from our definitions.
Example 4. Consider Figure 3 , the following statement expresses that in state H 0 , it is the case that in the future agent k knows agent i public opinion about p (as H
This example also shows how each ELTL-I statements can be used for representing individual goals. Hence, gathering individual goals lead to the construction of a boolean game. Before detailing this aspect we conclude the section by exhibiting the key results about model checking for the ELTL-I logic.
Model checking
The aim of this section is to show that model checking for ELTL-I is as hard as model checking for LTL. Recall that epistemic temporal logic has very high complexity [8] . We do so by reducing formulas containing an epistemic modality to propositional ones.
Lemma 5.
The following formulas are valid in ELTL-I: We now show two distribution laws for the operator K i with respect to conjunction and negation:
Lemma 6. The following formulas are valid in ELTL-I:
when α 1 and α 2 do not contain any occurrence of the modality K j for any j.
sketch. (i) and the right-to-left directions of (ii) are standard consequences of interpreting K i p over equivalence relations. We now prove the left-to-right direction of (ii) by induction on the construction of a propositional formula. Assume some history H and state S and suppose that the left part holds. This means that in all states ∈ S ∼i , either α 1 or α 2 is true. If both statements contains vis(j, p) or ¬vis(j, p) then Definition 5 entails that right-to-left direction hold, since either α 1 holds in all states ∈ S ∼i or α 2 holds in all states ∈ S ∼i . If α 1 (respectively α 2 ) contains some statement op(i, p), then the right-to-left direction holds as α 1 either holds in all states ∈ S ∼i or is false in all states. If it does not hold then α 2 is considered in a similar way to α 1 . Now suppose that α 1 and α 2 only contain statements of the form op(j, p) s.t. it is always the case that j = i. Then there must exist j, p such that vis(j, p) = 1. Otherwise, there exists a state S ′ ∈ S ∼i such that neither α 1 or α 2 hold (as all possible indistinguishable states must be considered). In conclusion, the right-to-left direction holds as either α 1 (respectively α 2 ) either holds in all states ∈ S ∼i or it does not hold in all states.
Finally, we reduce the nesting of the K i p operator:
The following formulas are valid in ELTL-I: sketch. The proof of (i) is a standard consequence of using equivalence relations. To prove (ii), let α be a propositional formula. Put first α in CNF and then distribute by Lemma 6 the modalities over conjunction. We now prove that
where ℓ is a literal. If ℓ = (¬)vis(j, p), then by Lemma 5 both sides of the equivalence reduce to (¬)vis(j, p). Suppose that ℓ = (¬)op(k, p) for some k ∈ N . If k = i, j then by Lemma 5 we can reduce K i ℓ to ℓ ∧ vis(k, p), and then it is straightforward to conclude by observing that K i ℓ ∧ vis(k, p) ↔ ℓ ∧ vis(k, p) ∧ vis(k, p) which in turn is equivalent to ℓ ∧ vis(k, p). The case of k = i and k = j is similar.
We are now ready to present an algorithm to translate a formula of ELTL-I into an equivalent one without any occurrence of the K i operator. Let an epistemic literal be a formula of the form (¬)K i ℓ for i ∈ N and propositional literal ℓ.
Input: a formula ϕ ∈ L ELTL-I Output: a formula red(ϕ) ∈ L ELTL-I with no epistemic operators while there is an epistemic operator in ϕ outside an epistemic literal do 1. choose a subformula K i α of ϕ such that α is without epistemic operators and is not a propositional literal; 2. put α in negated normal form (NNF); 3. distribute K i over ∧ and ∨ ; end 4. Reduce the depth modalities with Lemma 7; 5. Reduce the atoms with Lemma 5 ;
Algorithm 1: Reduction of the epistemic operator
The following proposition guarantees that the translation defined is also polynomial.
Lemma 8. Algorithm 1 terminates, red(ϕ) is polynomial in the size of ϕ, does not contain epistemic operators, and is equivalent to ϕ.
Proof. Lines 3, 4 and 5 apply equivalences that are valid by Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 and the fact that the following rule of replacement of equivalents is admissible in ELTL-I:
The negated normal form of a propositional formula (treating epistemic literals as propositional literals) is constructed by propositional equivalence and is polynomial in the size of the initial formula. Finally, since the modal depth is limited by Lemma 7 to |N |, we add a maximum of |N | extra variables of the form vis(j, p) for some j and some p to the translation of each epistemic literal.
Using Lemma 8, we are able to polynomially reduce every formula of the ELTL-I to an equivalent formula of the fragment LTL-I whose language L LTL-I is defined by the following BNF:
where i ranges over N and p ranges over I. We first show the following:
Proposition 2. The model checking problem of LTL-I is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. To verify membership it is sufficient to note that LTL-I is a special instance of LTL built out of the finite set of atomic propositions {op(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I} ∪ {vis(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I} and interpreted over a subset of the set of all possible histories for this language. Since the model checking problem for LTL is in PSPACE [21] , the model checking problem for LTL-I should also be in PSPACE.
To check that model checking of LTL-I is PSPACE-hard we are going to consider the following fragment of L LTL-I :
where i ranges over N and p ranges over I.
It is straightforward to check that the set of histories H includes all possible interpretations for this language which is nothing but the LTL language built out of the finite set of atomic propositions {vis(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I}. Since the model checking for LTL is is known to be PSPACE-hard [21] , it follows that the model checking for LTL-I is PSPACE-hard too.
We can now state the following theorem about complexity of model checking for ELTL-I.
Theorem 1. The model checking problem of ELTL-I is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. By Proposition 2 we know that model checking for LTL-I is PSPACE-complete. Every formula of ELTL-I can be reduced to an equivalent formula of polynomial size in LTL-I by Lemma 8, showing membership in PSPACE of model checking for ELTL-I. Since LTL-I is a sublogic of ELTL-I we also obtain PSPACE-hardness.
Games of influence
We are now ready to put together all the definitions introduced in the previous sections and give the following definition: 
Strategies
The following definition introduces the concept of strategy. The standard definition would call for a function that assigns in each point in time an action to each player. We choose to study simpler state-based strategies:
Definition 13 (strategy). A strategy for player i is a function that associates an action to every information state, i.e., Q i
A strategy profile is a tuple Q = (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ).
For notational convenience, we interchangeably use Q to denote a strategy profile (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) and the function Q : S −→ J such that Q(S) = a if and only if Q i (S) = a i , for all S ∈ S and i ∈ N . As the following definition highlights, every strategy profile Q combined with an initial state S 0 induces a history: Definition 14 (Induced history). Let S 0 be an initial state and let Q be a strategy profile. The history H S0,Q ∈ H induced by them is defined as follows:
Solution concepts
We start with the concept of winning uniform strategy. Intuitively speaking, Q i is a winning uniform strategy for player i if and only if i knows that, by playing this strategy, she will achieve her goal no matter what the other players will decide to do. Observe that a winning strategy is not necessarily winning uniform, as the private state of an agent is not necessarily accessible to the other players. As we will show in the following section, the concept of winning strategy is too strong for our setting. Let us then define the less demanding notion of weak dominance: 
Definition 15 (Winning strategy). Let IG be an influence game and let Q i be a strategy for player i. We say that Q i is a winning strategy for player i if and only if
A weakly dominant strategy is called uniform if (2) Now let us consider the following concept of best response. Intuitively speaking, Q i is a best response to Q −i if and only if player i knows that the worst she could possibly get by playing Q i , when the others play Q −i , is better or equal to the worst she could possibly get by playing a strategy different from Q i .
Definition 17 (Best response).
Let IG be an influence game, let Q i ∈ Q i and let Q −i ∈ Q −i . We say that Q i is a best response to Q −i wrt. initial state S 0 if and only if for all
If we rephrase this definition through some utility notion, then we can consider a fictitious utility U i (S) = 1 for states S that satisfy the goal of agent i, and U i (S) = 0 for states where the goal is not satisfied. In that case, our definition of best response corresponds to min S∈S
). This definition is justified on the basis of the prudential criterion according to which, if an agent does not have a probability distribution over the set of possible states, she should focus on the worst possible outcome and choose the action whose worst possible outcome is at least as good as the worst possible outcome of any other actions (see, e.g., [22, 3, 4] ).
Definition 17 allow us to define the concept of Nash equilibrium for games with incomplete information such as influence games:
Definition 18 (Nash equilibrium). Let IG be an influence game and let Q be a strategy profile. Q is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all i ∈ N , Q i is a best response to Q −i .
Influence network and solution concepts
In this section we show some preliminary results about the interplay between the network structure and the existence of solutions concepts. In what follows we only consider influence games where the aggregation function is the unanimous one (see Definition 8). In the interest of space, most proofs will only be sketched. Let us first give the following: To see this, consider that if an individual goal γ i concerns the visibility of another agent about a given issue p, then this second agent can always respond hide(p) and make sure that γ i is false.
Let us now introduce a simpler language for goals, in order to study the limitations of considering winning strategies in this setting. Let LTL-I J be the language of future goals about a subset of agent J ⊆ N , which focuses on the future opinions of agents in J without considering the visibility. This language is defined by the following BNF:
where j ∈ J and p ranges over I.
Let us introduce some further notation. If i, j ∈ N we say that i controls j if either Inf (j) = {j}, or for all paths l 1 , . . . , l n such that (l i , l i+1 ) ∈ E, l 1 = i and l n = j, we have that i controls each l k . We can now prove the following: Proof. One direction is easier: if i controls agent j, then her winning strategy is to always play reveal(p) in case her goal is consistent with her opinion, e.g. if her goal is op(j, p) and H B i,0 (p) = 1. Otherwise always playing hide(p) guarantees that her goal will be satisfied. Note that the consistency of γ i is crucial here.
For the other direction, consider a network in which j has more than one influencer, say k, which is however not controlled by i. A simple case study shows that there always exists an initial state in which i does not have a winning strategy. For instance, if γ i = Xop(j, p), then in an initial state in which B j (p) = 0 it is sufficient for agent k to play reveal(p) to make sure that agent j never updates her belief, and hence that γ i will not be satisfied.
Proposition 4 shows that the concept of winning strategy is too strong in influence games, as it can only be applied in situations in which an agent has exclusive control over the opinion of another.
Let us now focus on a particular influence game, in which the agents' goal is to reach a consensus about p. That is, each agent i adopts the following goal:
Consensus means that the conjunction of each individual goal leads to a state where all agents have p as opinion. 
for that former case, definition of unanimity entails that H S,(skip,Q−i) |= j =i op(j, p) and H S,(hide(p),Q−i) |= j =i op(j, p). In a similar way, we can show that strategy hide(p) is a best response to any strategy Q −i if B i (p) = 0. We then built up a strategy profile Q w.r.t.
, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
Observe that if the network E is not fully connected this result does not hold since, for instance, the opinion of an isolated agent cannot be changed. Let us now focus on specific shapes of the influence graph where weakly dominant strategy exists. Those strategies concern the sources the agents who have no influencers.
Theorem 3. If E is acyclic, I
* is the set of sources, and S 0 is coherent with i * ∈I * γ i , and each source influences only one individual, then for all i * there exists a weakly dominant strategy. sketch. If i * ∈I * γ i * is coherent with S 0 then there exists some induced history H by some strategy Q c such that H S0,Q c |= i * ∈I * γ i * . Consider a source i * and its goal γ i * . Subformulas of its goal refer to agents that it directly influences or not. In the latter case all the strategies of the source will be equivalent (hence weak-dominant). If they talk about the (only) individuals that is influenced by the source, then by the monotonicity of the aggregation procedure it is weakly dominant to play reveal(p) if the source goal is coherent with the source's belief. And hide(p) otherwise. (A case study is required to obtain the full proof).
This result, once more, shows the difficulty of playing an influence game. It is actually possible to exhibit examples of acyclic influence graphs with sources influencing multiple agents where no weakly dominant strategies exist for these sources.
Computational complexity
In this section we exemplify the use of ELTL-I and the complexity results presented in Section 3 for the computation of strategic aspects of influence games. We do so by providing a PSPACE algorithm to decide whether a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Let MEMBERSHIP(F) be the following problem: given as input a set of individuals N , issues I, goals γ i for i ∈ N -which together with F form an influence game IG -and a strategy profile Q, we want to know whether Q is a Nash equilibrium of IG.
The algorithm presented in [14] in the setting of iterated boolean games cannot be directly applied to our setting for two reasons. First, our histories are generated by means of an aggregation function F that models the diffusion of opinions -i.e., agents have a concurrent control on a set of propositional variables. Second, not all conceivable strategies are available to players, as we focus on state-based strategies.
We therefore begin by translating a state-based strategy in ELTL-I. Clearly, a conjunction of literals α(S) can be defined to uniquely identify a state S: α(S) will specify the private opinion of all individuals and their visibility function. Given action a, let
We can now associate a ELTL-I formula to each strategy Q i :
If Q is a strategy profile, let τ (Q) = i∈N τ i (Q i ). We now need to encode the aggregation function into a formula as well. Recall the unanimous issue-by-issue aggregation function of Definition 8 and consider the following formulas unan(i, p):
as well as the following formula unan(i, ¬p):
This formula ensures that if the influencers of agent i are unanimous, then agent i's opinion should be defined according to the three cases described in Definition 8. Recall that, while actions take one time unit to be effectuated (hence the X operator in front of vis(j, p)), the diffusion of opinions is simultaneous. Let now:
This formula encodes the transition process defined by the opinion diffusion. τ (F U i ) is polynomial in both the number of individuals and the number of issues (in the worst case it is quadratic in n and linear in m). We are now ready to prove the following result: Proof. Let Q be a strategy profile for game IG. The following algorithm can be used to check whether Q is a Nash equilibrium. For all individuals i ∈ N , we first check the following entailment:
in the language of LTL built out the set of atomic propositions {op(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I} ∪ {vis(i, p) : i ∈ N and p ∈ I}, where red(γ i ) is defined as in Algorithm 1 in Section 3.2.
If this is not the case, we consider all the possible strategies Q ′ i = Q i for agent ithere are exponentially many, but each one can be specified in space polynomial in the size of the input -and check the following entailment:
If the answer is positive we output NO, otherwise we proceed until all strategies and all individuals have been considered. The entailment for LTL can be reduced to the problem of checking validity in LTL. Indeed, the following equivalence holds:
Since the problem of checking validity in LTL can be solved in PSPACE [21] , we obtain the desired upper bound.
We conjecture that the problem is also PSPACE-complete, as a reduction in line with the one by [14] is likely to be obtained.
Observe that Theorem 4 can easily be generalised to all aggregation procedures that can be axiomatised by means of polynomially many ELTL-I formulas -with the eventual use of Lemma 8 to translate ELTL-I-formulas in LTL. This is not the case for all aggregation procedures: the majority rule -i.e., the rule that updates the opinion of an individual to copy that of the majority of its influencers -would for instance require an exponential number of formulas, one for each subset of influencers that forms a relative majority. The study of the axiomatisation of aggregation procedures for opinion diffusion constitutes a promising direction for future work.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we proposed a model, inspired from related work on iterated boolean games [14] , that allows us to explore some basic aspects of strategic reasoning in social influence. We grounded our model on related work [18, 12] , which modelled the process of social influence by means of aggregation procedures from either judgment aggregation or belief merging, and we augmented it with the introduction of a simple logical language for the expression of temporal and epistemic goals. This allowed us to inquire into the multiple aspects of the relation between the structure of the influence network, and the existence of well-known game-theoretic solution concepts. Moreover, we were able to show that model checking for our language, as well as the problem of checking whether a given profile is a Nash equilibrium, is in PSPACE, hence no harder than the linear temporal logic on which our language is based.
There are multiple directions in which this work can be expanded. First, the introduction of extra actions to add or sever trust links may add an important dynamic aspect to the network structure. Second, we may allow agents to lie about their private preferences, hence providing them with more strategies to attain their goals. Third, to develop our framework to its full generality we could introduce integrity constraints among the issues at hand. In all these cases, a deeper study of the interconnection between the network structure and the strategies played by the agents of extreme interest, and has the potential to unveil general insights about the problem of social influence.
